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There is, in the record, testimony tending to support
the following facts upon which respondent relies in support of the judgment.
On or prior to June 12, 1949 a written instrument,
purporting to be a listing agreement, was executed by the
plaintiff in his own name and defendant in form as set out
in plaintiff's amended complaint, the material parts of the
instrument being:
"In consideration of your agreement to list the
property, described on the reverse side of this
contract, with you during the life hereof, and to
use your best efforts to find a purchaser therefor,
I hereby grant you for the period of six months
from date hereof, the exclusive right to sell or
exchange said property or any part thereof, at
the price and terms stated hereon, or at such
other price, terms or exchange to which I may
agree.
"During the life of this contract, if you find
a buyer who is ready, able and willing to buy said
property, or any part thereof at said price and
terms, OR ANY OTHER PRICE OR TERMS TO
WHICH I MAY AGREE IN WRITING, or if I
agree to an exchange of said property or any part
thereof, or if said property or any part thereof
is sold or exchanged during said term, firm or
corporation, I agree to pay you $500.00 commission on such sale or exchange, or, if it is sold
or exchanged within three months after such,
expiration to any person to whom you have previously offered it, I agree to pay you the commission above stated; and in case of the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms
of this agreement, agree to pay a reasonable
attorneys fees and all costs of collection.
Accepted June 12, 1949 by (Signed)
W. R. Young.
Dated at Richfield, Utah
19
(Signed) Ray H. Buchanan, Owner."
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Nothing appears in the instrument and nothing was
said by plaintiff at the time of the listing as to whether or
not he was a real estate broker or real estate salesman
or otherwise; that Plaintiff was in fact a real estate salesman. (Trans, p. 39) Prior to the signing of the sales agreement he had a conversation with a real estate broker, E. H.
Bardsley as follows: (Trans, p. 56-57) Bardsley testified.
"I had paid my state license and my bond for my commission. Mr. Young came to the office and wanted to know
if he could write under my commission. I told him I only
renewed my license so that the next year if I wanted to
sell real estate it would only cost me half the price that
it would if I let pass by, but I didn't intend to make
any effort to sell real estate during the year 1949 and he
asked me if he could sell under my license and I told him
yes, with this understanding that he was to be responsible
for all sales and that all contracts must go to an attorney,
that I wasn't to be implicated in any way whatsoever
through court or otherwise and he was to have all that
was made as commission."
It also appears that Bardsley did not renew his license
after January 1st, 1950. (Trans, p. 50).
"After the execution of the purported listing agreement and during the year 1949 Mr. Young talked with
Cecil King a number of times relative to his buying the
Buchanan place but Mr. King was not interested at the
price listed $17,500.00 and nothing definite came of it."
(Trans, p. 13, 14, 15)
"In the last half of January, 1950 Mr. Young talked
with Buchanan. Mr. Young testified that he told the de-
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fendant that King was interested in the place but the
price was too high; that he tried to get King to come. Ray
asked me to continue my efforts to sell the place at
$17,500.00 (Trans, p. 19)
About the 1st to 4th of March, 1950 Ray said tell the
man (Wegener) We'll take $16,500.00" (Trans, p. 21).
Young also testified he communicated the information
to King that the price had been reduced (Trans, p. 22).
"King said it looked a lot better that he'd take a look at
it." Young further testified that he took Wegener down
to look at the place the fore part of March. Ray and his
wife and Cecil King and his wife were there (Trans, p. 27)
"I said to Cecil, 'Cecil are you going to buy this place'. He
said, 'I think I am.' I said remember my listing is still in effect.' He said, 'I know i t . ' "
Mr. Buchanan sold the property to Mr. King for
$16,500.00; $1,000.00 was paid in February 1950 and the
remaining $15,500.00 when the deed was delivered.
The following facts are controlling and entitle the
defendant to a reversal of this case:
1. The listing was not with a real estate broker, neither in form nor in fact. Neither was it_a_
ty* ^ ^ J l g f e 1 * ? w i t h a real estate salesma^ The contract,
%*&^YL
any, was entered into with W. k. Young person\*^~
ally and without reference, either in writing or
H
orally, to any real estate broker or real estate
salesman. (Trans, p. 39)
2. Mr. Bardsley when he told Mr. Young that
Young could write under his license, made it definite that Mr. Bardsley was not to be implicated in
any way in Court or otherwise. That is Young
could write under the Bardsley license but Bards-
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ley, the only person under bond and authorized to
sell real estate and assume the responsibilities of
a licensed broker, specifically refused such responsibility.
3. No sale of the property nor any contract
for the sale of the property was entered into during the year 1949. The Bardsley Brokerage license
expired at the end of 1949. His right to sell real
estate as a broker ceased and necessarily any right
of Mr. Young to sell under the license came to an
end with the expiration of the license.
4. There is testimony in the record to the
effect that in 1950, Mr. Young worked under a
real estate brokers license issued to C. W. Powell.
But that is immaterial because:
^* A. Any right existing under the Bardsley
license expired with the license.
B. There is nothing in the record
attempted transfer or rights
any duties accepted by him
ence to the Buchanan listing
personally in 1949.

to show any
to Powell of
with referwith Young

C. No sale was made or contract entered
into while the Bardsley license was valid.
No right could be transferred to Powell
by Young and none was transferred to
Powell by Bardsley. If there had been, the
h expiration of the Bardsley rights under
his license would have the listing under
I
his license.
5. The purported listing contract expired
December 12, 1949. December 31st, 1949 Mr.
Young's salesmanship license under Mr. Bardsley
automatically expired and there was no renewal.
6. In January Alice Buchanan told Mr. Warner, another real estate Broker, that the listing
was still with Mr. Young. But in view of the fact
that Young's license with or under Mr. Bardsley
had expired and because of her not being party to
any contract the statement is immaterial.
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The entire transaction was handled in harmony with
Mr. Young acting independently of any Broker.
The purported contract was signed by Mr. Young and
Mr. Buchanan as individuals, nothing being said by Mr.
Young about his arrangments with Mr. Bardsley, No
where in the record is there any evidence of Mr. Young
indicating to any one that he was a real estate salesman
acting under a broker.
The complaint, the summons, the amended complaint
of the plaintiff and the pleadings of the defendant, including motions and answers to complaint, are all drawn showing that Mr. Young was the only interested party in the
transaction and the only party asking judgment against the
defendant. The case came to trial October 3rd, 1951. The
trial was conducted on the theory that Young was the
only interested plaintiff and the person entitled to judgment against Buchanan. But at the conclusion of Plaintiff's
testimony on the merits of the case Plaintiff interrogated
Mr. Bardsley and then asked leave in open Court to amend
the complaint so as to make Bardsley a party plaintiff with
Young and asking that judgment be that the plaintiff Bardsley have judgment against the defendant for the use and
benefit of plaintiff W. R. Young (Trans, p. 58-59). The
motion was granted in open Court and on the 5th of October, 1951 plaintiff filed an amended complaint in which
Mr. Bardsley was impleaded as a plaintiff praying for judgment in favor of Ernest H. Bardsley for the use and benefit
of W. R. Young.
Thereafter the said Bardsley personally and by his
Counsel, Carvell Mattsson, on the 8th day of November,
A.D. 1951 moved the court for an order dismissing him
5
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from the action and eliminating his name as a party thereto, and alleging that he has no interest in the subject matter; that he did not file any complaint and did not ask leave
to become a party or authorize any one to make application
or to act in his behalf (See motion filed Nov. 8, 1951.)
The motion was denied. Findings of fact conclusions of
law and judgment were entered on the 20th day of February, 1952 and a further order entered denying Bardsleys
motion.
The judgment entered February 20, 1952 is that Plaintiff E. H. Bardsley, for the use and benefit of the plaintiff
W. R. Young, do have and recover of and from the defendant R. H. Buchanan etc. The proceedings do not in any
manner change the effect of the purported judgment. If
it is anything it is Young's judgment. There is no complaint filed by Bardsley, amended or otherwise, asking for
or seeking a judgment in favor of and for his benefit. Mr.
Young is still the active moving party in the case and is
the real beneficiary of any judgment entered and enforced
against defendant and appellant.
When Mr. Bardsley talked with Mr. Young, he specifically provided under the undisputed evidence of Young and
Bardsley that he was not to be implicated in any way
whatsoever through Court or otherwise; that he did not
intend to sell real estate in 1949, and that Young was to be
responsible for all sales. The expression ("Young could sell
under his license") became meaningless and the relationship
is unknown to the law.
When Bardsley learned of judgment entered he employed counsel to secure a dismissal from the action. The
motion was denied. He was named as another plaintiff and
6
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thereby is made the stooge or dummy by which plaintiff
proposes to enforce rights against the defendant which he
did not in fact have and which he has no right to assert,
legally or otherwise.
The Statute in force at the time of these transactions
provided:
"It shall be unlawful for any real estate salesman
to accept a commission or other valuable consideration for the performance of any of the acts herein
specified from any person except his employer who
must be a licensed real estate broker."
Section 82-2-10 U.C.A. 1943.
Had Mr. Buchanan offered to pay a valuable consideration or commission to Mr. Young for the acts Young alleges and claims he performed for Mr. Buchanan, it would
have been unlawful for Young to receive it. How can there
be valid judgment enforcing the unlawful act. If Young
could not voluntarily receive, how can he be beneficiary of
judgment in his favor?
Agreements in violation of positive law are illegal and
void: 17 C.J. Section 555, under "contracts".
"Courts will not enforce a cause of action
arising out of an illegal transaction nor entertain
an action for a division of the proceeds of such
transaction. This is undoubtedly the rule, and this
Court has gone farther, holding that not only
must the action fail where the evidence of plaintiff discloses that his cause is based on an illegal
or immoral transaction, but that the defendant
may allege and prove the illegality or immorality
of the transaction and the Court will then refuse
its aid to either party, leaving them where it finds
them."
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Obradovitch v Walker Brothers Bankers
80 Utah 587-602
Haddock v Salt Lake City, 23 Utah 521
"No principle of law is better settled than a
party to an illegal contract cannot come into a
Court of Law and ask to have his illegal objects
carried out. Nor can he set up a case in which he
must necessarily disclose an ,, illegal purpose as the
Ground Work of his claim.
13 C. J. Page 492, Section 440, Contracts.
The Statutes further provide:
"Any person violating any of the provisions of
this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor, and . . . .
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $50.00
and not more than $299.00, or by imprisonment
in the County jail not to exceed six months, or by
both such fine and imprisonment."
It might well be suggested that the favor Buchanan did
Young in refusing to make the demanded payment probably
kept him out of jail for a term for which, in equity and
justice, Mr. Young might well reimburse Mr. Buchanan, at
least to the amount of the fine that might have been levied
on him.
It is also provided in Section 82-2-3:
"The term real estate salesman shall mean and
include any person employed or engaged by or on
behalf of a licensed real estate broker to do or
deal in any act or transaction set out or comprehended by the definition of a real estate broker in
section 82-2-2 for compensation or otherwise."
and by 82-2-3:
"A real estate broker includes all persons
who for another and for a fee, commission or
other valuable consideration or who with the intention or expectancy or upon the promise of receiving or collecting a fee, commission or other
valuable consideration, sells or offers to sell real
estate . . . . "
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The testimony of Mr. Young is that he was a licensed
real estate salesman. As to the employment, his employer,
E. H. Bardsley, testified that Young inquired of him if
he could write under Bardsley's commission and Bardsley
told Young he could sell under his license with the understanding that he, Young, was responsible for all sales and
that he, Bardsley, was not to be implicated in any way
through Court or otherwise. There is no other evidence
relative to the employment of Young by Bardsley.
If that conversation constituted Young a real estate
salesman under Bardsley, then it follows that Young was
in fact in the employ of Bardsley and he had no right to
receive compensation from Buchanan. The purported listing contract entered i ^
if
It had any effect, created a listing agreement with Bardsley and Young had no right to enforce it.
Although Bardsley stated to Young that he wasi to have
the commissions, it could not create a privity of contract
between Young and Buchanan because that would be a
violation of the statutory provisions that the real estate
salesman had no right to enforce.
If Young was in fact a real estate salesman employed
by Bardsley, then although there is no evidence of the further facts, it would have to be assumed that he otherwise
complied with the Statutory provisions relative to salesmans license; That is that he, in addition to his application,
stated who his last employee was, the length of time he had
been engaged, the name of the person then employing him
and the name of the person whose employ he is about to
enter, and that his application was accompanied by a state9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ment from Bardsley recommending that the license bo
granted. The license would have been issued showing the
name of the real estate broker and would have been mailed
to the broker and kept in the custody and control of Mr.
Bardsley. When Mr. Bardsley's brokers license was revoked,
as it was, at the end of 1949, Mr. Young's license was suspended pending the change of employer and the issuance
of a new license. When the license of Mr. Young terminated
at the end of 1949 under Mr. Bardsley as Broker, it became Bardsley's duty to deliver or mail to the commission
Young's real estate salesman's license, and Mr. Bardsley's
authority to deal in real estate having expired, his contract
with Mr. Buchanan also expired, and Young's authority
under Bardsley ceased. Section 82-2-8 U.C.A. 1943.
Again: Section 82-2-9 provides:
"The revocation of a broker's license shall automatically suspend every salesman's license granted
to any person by virtue of his employment by the
broker whose license has been revoked, pending the
change of employer and the issuance of a new
license.
Bardsley's license as a real estate broker expired December 31st, 1949 and the revocation automatically suspended Young's license, there being neither broker nor salesman.
It seems to follow that the Buchanan contract which expired December 12, 1949, also lost it's force.
If the listing set out in the Young-Buchanan memorandum has any effect it must be construed as a listing with
the Broker. Bardsley had the power of enforcement, he was
liable to Young for his compensation and Young's right of
action if he had any was against Bardsley and not against
Buchanan. If Bardsley had a right of action against Buch10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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anan it was in his own right and not for the use and benefit of Young. The commission earned, if any, may have been
the measure of Young's rights against Bardsley, but in
view of Statute, his claims, if any, were against his broker,
not against the owner who, under the law, had listed with
the broker, if any one. In view of the statutory provisions,
if Buchanan is liable to any one it is the broker and a
judgment improperly rendered against Buchanan in this
action would not be a bar to Bardsley bringing his action
in his own right against Buchanan. In other words, if under these proceedings, this judgment is upheld, then Buchanan becomes subject to a double liability.
But Bardsley, at the time Young Claims to have inquired of Bardsley whether Young could write under his
commission, stated that Young was to be responsible for
all sales and that he, Bardsley, was not to be implicated in
any way, in Court or otherwise. But the essence of the
legal relationship created when a broker employs a salesman is that the listing is with the broker; it is the broker
who represents the owner in making the sales; it is the
broker who is authorized to complete and fill out such
forms or legal documents as may be necessary, to which
the broker is a party as agent of the vendor, not the salesman.
That Young did not purport to comply with these
statutory provisions is demonstrated by the fact that he
took the listing in his own name; he claimed right of compensation personally from Buchanan; he brought action to
recover a fee he was not entitled to under the law; he
filed an amended complaint still asking for an unlawful
11
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recovery from Buchanan, and then to avoid the unlawful
situation he asked to make Bardsley a party plaintiff and
that judgment be entered in his favor for the use of Young.
That is; Young merely asked the Court to make Bardsley a
party plaintiff so Young could use him in enforcing the unlawful contract he had entered into.
Judgment was in fact entered that plaintiff E. H.
Bardsley, for the use and benefit of plaintiff Young do
have and recover of and from the Defendant etc. It is a
plain case of attempting to do by indirection what cannot
be done directly. If there is any cause of action pleaded or
found by the Court, it is an action existing at the time
of bringing the action in favor of the Broker Bardsley and
not in favor of the plaintiff Young. To say it is in favor
of Bardsley for the use of Young is denying the fair import of all the facts. The statutes authorize Bardsley to
sell real estate for a commission. They also authorize him
to employ a salesman to assist the broker in making sales
and to compensate the salesman for such assistance. But
the salesman has no right to ask any one other than the
broker who employs him for his compensation.
If the purported listing agreement were to be given
any binding effect under the law, it must be by reading
into it provisions not found in the instrument and not talked of by the parties at any time to the bringing of this
action, or thereafter until trial was had, that the instrument, although executed by Young, was, in fact, for the
use and benefit of Bardsley. That is substituting a wholly
new cause of action that could not be established by evidence establishing a cause of action in Young, had the contract not been illegal.
12
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In Hallett vs Parrish, an Idaho Case reported in 51 pac,
page 108, the Court says:
,
:
"Under the very liberal provisions of our statute, a Court should not permit a person to be sub. stituted as plaintiff in the place of the plaintiff
who brought the suit when the person substituted
was the real and only party in interest at the
commencement of the suit."
For still stronger reasons, it seems to the writer, that
a person ought not be brought into a cause as a substituted
party, or additional plaintiff, at the request of the original
plaintiff with the view of compelling the real party in interest to prosecute an action for the use and benefit of the
original party plaintiff, where it develops, as in this case,
that original party plaintiff had no cause of action in fact,
where the claimed cause of action, as to the original party
plaintiff, was illegal and unenforcible, and where, if the
claimed cause of action were enforced, it would have the
effect of the original plaintiff using the Courts to enforce
a payment to the original plaintiff that would make him
guilty of crime in accepting the payment or satisfaction of
the judgment.
Finally; The law makes it illegal for the original plaintiff to enforce payment, were there an enforcible
contract.
The fact that the impleaded plaintiff had no
contractual rights as against the defendant, that
he expressly refused to accept any responsibility
as broker, and that, long prior to the sale of the
property to King, Bardsley's license as a broker
had expired, denies him the right to judgment,
13
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either personally or for the use and benefit of the
original plaintiff.
With All Duplications and Repetitions,
Respectfully Submitted,
N. J. BATES,
Attorney for Appellant.
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